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Abstract  
The rhetorical fear appeal is a technique of political communication that seeks to elicit an 
emotional response in receivers with the intention of provoking them to political action 
desired by the rhetor. This paper examines a single example of fear appeal construction in the 
British press, the Mail Online’s ‘Prime Minister Corbyn and the 1000 days that Destroyed 
Britain’ (2015), through analysis of its use of two defining political myths, a conservative myth 
of declinism, and the utopia/anti-utopia binary myth. I firstly examine the origins and 
contemporary uses of fear appeals as techniques of political persuasion, before going on to 
examine how these are constructed. I then go on to analyse the Mail Online article’s use of 
these two powerful political myths, one, declinism, which I argue is utilised descriptively for 
the purposes of discourse construction, and the other, utopia/anti-utopia, which is utilised 
instructively.  Finally, I propose a method of analysis combining recent approaches to the 
critical discourse analysis of myth with the cognitive-motivational-relational theory of 
emotion drawn from social psychology, in order to show how the Mail Online article is 
constructed as a discursive fear appeal. 
Keywords: Fear appeal, myth, declinsim, utopia/anti-utopia, critical discourse analysis 
1. Introduction 
Accusations and counter accusations of framing political strategies to arouse 
negative emotional responses have dominated British politics in recent years. 
An especially forceful condemnation of this was launched by the then Scottish 
National Party leader Alex Salmond who accused the BBC after the Scottish 
referendum campaign (2014-15) of ‘institutional bias’ (Green The Independent 
Online 14/09/2014). Salmond further claimed that the outcome of the 
referendum had been significantly influenced by a ‘scaremongering campaign’ 
(Harris The Huffington Post UK 18/09/2015). Dubbed at the time ‘Project 
Fear’, (Gordon Herald Scotland 21/12/2014) this has quickly become the 
popular designation given to alarmist political campaigning that seeks to 
persuade target populations by arousing fearful emotional responses. More 
recently, during the bitter European referendum campaign in the UK (2016), 
Brexit spokespersons accused the Remain group of pursuing ‘Project Fear’ in 
their campaign to remain within the EU (Bennett The Telegraph 20th/06/2016) 
whilst being themselves accused of similar scaremongering especially over 
immigration (Wright Independent Online 20/05/2016).  
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In this paper I examine the warnings of an existential threat to Britain’s political 
and economic future from a potential Labour Government led by Jeremy 
Corbyn as they are expressed through a piece of journalistic fiction in the right 
wing British tabloid, Daily Mail Online. Published immediately prior to 
Corbyn’s election as leader of the Labour Party in 2015, ‘Prime Minster Corbyn 
and the 1000 Days that Destroyed Britain’ (Thomas Mail Online 28/08/15) 
takes the form of a speculative fiction and as such is a relatively unusual type of 
article for a serious national newspaper. The article’s alarmist content is framed 
to appeal to the political dispositions and sympathies of its readership, the 
overwhelming number of whom were either Conservative Party voters or voters 
of the populist right wing UK Independence Party (Greenslade The Guardian 
Online 08/06/15).  
I approach my analysis of ‘Prime Minster Corbyn and the 1000 Days that 
Destroyed Britain’ as a rhetorical fear appeal. Below I discuss the fear appeal 
as a technique of media framing before going on to examine how this article is 
constructed discursively to produce specific emotional responses. I do so by 
examining its use of two political myths (Flood 2002, Kelsey 2015). Specifically 
a conservative myth of declinism (Black et al 2013, Tomlinson 2000), and the 
apocalyptic determinism inherent in the binary utopia/anti-utopia myth 
drama (Moylan 2000, Kumar 1987). I go on to explain that by utilising elements 
of Kelsey’s discourse mythological approach (2015), and by combining this with 
the appraisal theory approach to fear appeal construction developed in social 
psychology, particularly by Lazerus (Lazerus 1984, De Castella et al 2009), how 
a CDA model of fear appeal analysis is possible. I then show that by adopting 
this approach it enables us to go beyond the critical examination of specific 
content formation to explain how such fear appeals are constructed in the first 
place.  
2. Fear Appeals 
The fear appeal is an historical component of wartime propaganda. Taylor 
(2003) argues that the ‘time honoured’ technique of atrocity propaganda, from 
which contemporary notions of fear appeals derive (Conway et al 2007: 200), 
was enthusiastically taken up by the British press during World War 1 in a 
‘convergence of total war and the mass media.’ This allowed for the construction 
and circulation of stories that proved to be, not only ‘good copy’, but 
importantly, ‘helped to sustain the moral condemnation of the enemy’ (ibid: 
180). The persuasive moral force of such stories is important according to 
Charteris-Black (2005), since ‘by making decisions about what is right and 
wrong, good and bad, an individual engages in a process of self-legitimatisation 
that places them within a social group that shares those meanings’ (ibid: 21). 
This parallels Dillard’s definition of the term, defining fear appeals in their 
broadest sense, (as) ‘messages that attempt to achieve opinion change by 
establishing the negative consequences of failing to agree with the advocated 
opinion’ (Dillard 1994).  
De Castella et al (2009: 3) argue that whilst identification of forms of political 
rhetoric that ‘convey, monger, or sustain’ a climate of heightened political 
tension and anxiety such as the War on Terror are frequent in discourse analysis 
approaches, they are rather less frequently used to ‘specifically examine how 
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fear appeals are constructed.’ De Castella’s social psychological approach 
proceeds from an understanding of fear appeal that must include fear inducing 
events, situations or threats, whether historical or speculative, and that 
explicitly links these through discursive frames of persuasion to a course of 
political action or response (ibid: 3). I intend to proceed with my own analysis 
using this definition. I want also to adopt the distinction between fright and 
anxiety that Lazerus makes (Lazerus 1994, De Castella et al 2009), since I 
believe this more accurately captures the manipulative intent of the 
contemporary fear appeal.  
Lazerus (1994: 234) argues that emotions are induced by core relational 
themes, and he makes a distinction between fear, or fright, and anxiety based 
on the different estimation of this in relation to the two emotional states. The 
core relational theme of fear, or fright, he contends, is the ‘concrete and sudden 
danger of imminent physical harm’ (ibid: 235). This I think fails to capture 
accurately the manipulative quality of contemporary fear appeals.  With 
contemporary fear appeals the threat of harm is symbolic rather than concrete, 
and imminence or directness is non-specific and ambiguous, as in Conway’s 
description of the construction of fear appeals through ‘the enemy’s mission to 
destroy the dreams and ideals’ of a target population (Conway et al 2007: 200). 
Anxiety as an emotional description far better conveys this sense of non-
physical, yet existential uncertainty and threat which I think characterises the 
rhetorical construction of contemporary fear appeals such as ‘Prime Minister 
Corbyn and the 1000 Days that Destroyed Britain.’ 
The rhetorical construction of a sense of uncertainty and dread characteristic of 
this type of fear appeal enables what Pfau (2007:219) describes as the 
construction of a discourse ‘in which a rhetor ‘tries to get a target audience to 
adopt a course of action by portraying the only alternative as some horrible 
disaster.’’ The perception of this impending disaster, and crucially the appraisal 
of its specific character, danger and proximity is vital to the position I wish to 
develop here since it recognises that ‘specific emotional reactions stem not from 
situations, events, or objects but from cognitive interpretations or appraisals of 
these things’ (De Castella 2009: p4). Accordingly emotional reactions are not 
produced by the situation or occurrence directly, but by the how these are 
thought about, interpreted and appraised through ‘forms of socially shared 
cognitions’ (van Dijk, in Wodak et al 201: 66). In this way De Castella’s social 
psychological approach to the construction of fear appeals connects to the 
influential socio-cognitive model of discourse construction developed most 
notably in the work of van Dijk (van Dijk, 2008, in Wodak et al 2016).  
Fear appeals are rhetorical strategies that ‘draw on already existing discourses 
and genres’ (Kelsey 2012:27), and which are in turn processed by participants 
through varieties of shared knowledge located in memory, a shared cognition. 
According to van Dijk (Wodak et al 2016: 68) ‘generic, socially shared 
knowledge is (applied) in the construction of personal mental models that 
represent our individual experiences, perceptions and interpretations of events 
and situations’. Further, and since our non- experience based knowledge of 
these things is also, always, significantly contributed to by discourses 
throughout our lives, both the production and comprehension of discourses 
requires vast amounts of acquired knowledge. This leads van Dijk to point out 
the inherent power differential implicit through this patterning when he says 
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that ‘some groups or organisations in society have privileged access to 
specialised knowledge and may manipulate or otherwise control public 
discourse and the subsequent actions of others’ (ibid: 68-69).  
I argue that ‘Prime Minister Corbyn and the 1000 Days that Destroyed Britain’ 
provides just such an instance of this manipulative discursive practice (van 
Dijk, in Wodak et al 2016:71). For my analysis I accept the distinction made by 
Pfau (Pfau 2007; McLear 2010) that fear appeals may be differentiated between 
‘dichotomous’ and ‘civic’ variants. The concern here is with the dichotomous 
fear appeal that Pfau identifies ‘is depressingly common in contemporary 
political discourse’ (2007:233). Dichotomous fear appeals ‘divide the 
respondent’s available options into two mutually exclusive actions (events) 
where one will (supposedly) occur if the other does not’ (ibid: 231). According 
to McLear, it is precisely this ‘closed offness’ that is characteristic of the 
manipulative intentions of the approach, since the ‘dichotomous fear appeal 
‘aims to foreclose audience options’’ (McLear 2010: 27).  
The Mail Online piece operates according to this by presenting through a 
speculative fiction an account of a Corbyn led government descending 
irrevocably into a dystopian nightmare of economic and social collapse. It offers 
receivers of this text only a single alternative other than to accept this, that of 
rejecting political change in favour of maintaining the present status quo. 
Dichotomous fear appeals have this simplifying function, reducing historical 
complexity to fundamental binary oppositions and presenting political choice 
and action as one of two mutually exclusive alternatives. As rhetorical strategies 
they are constructed discursively using the repertoire of available discourses 
and genres that form what van Dijk refers to as ‘shared sociocultural knowledge’ 
(van Dijk, in Wodak et al 2016: 65).  
Among these shared discursive resources are what Flood (2002) and Kelsey 
(2012, 2015) have termed political myths. Through developing a specifically 
critical discourse approach to the analysis of myth, Kelsey has shown how the 
myth of the Blitz Spirit was used to invoke representations of the past that 
served contemporary ideological ends in the immediate aftermath of the 
London terrorist bombings of 2007 (Kelsey, 2012, 2015). Myths, he argues, 
have a ‘simplifying… suppressive role, and functions ideologically in the 
preferred messages it delivers’ (Kelsey 2012: 25). Political myths, I contend, are 
the perfect conveyors for fear appeals, being ‘a narrative based representation 
of intangible experiences that are evocative because they are unconsciously 
linked to emotions such as sadness, happiness and fear’ (Charteris-Black 2012: 
23). ‘Prime Minister Corbyn and the 1000 Days that Destroyed Britain’ is 
discursively constructed using two overlapping political myths that I set out 
below. First, a right wing myth of declinism which in the text functions as an 
explanatory model for the purposes of receivers, and secondly a utopia/anti-
utopia binary myth schema which functions for receivers instructively.  
3. The Declinist Myth in Political Discourse  
Declinism is a historiographical narrative of the fortunes of Britain’s prosperity 
as a nation relative to its economic performance and to its comparative standing 
on the international stage (Tomlinson 2000: 9). It is considered to have 
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emerged as an account of national decline in the post second world war era 
during the late 1950’s and early 1960’s (ibid: 9), and reached its apogee during 
the 1970’s. In this decade a declinist narrative fused with a sense of almost 
continuous political crisis (Black and Pemberton 2013, Hay 2010, Tomlinson 
2000) giving rise to the ‘contemporary vision of the 1970’s as a dismal decade 
in contemporary British history’ (Black and Pemberton: 2) and culminating at 
the end of the decade in the convulsive ‘Winter of Discontent’. It is at this point, 
according to Hay (2010: 451), ‘that the new right’s account of a crisis of an 
overextended, overloaded and ungovernable state ‘held to ransom’ by the trade 
unions emerged and acquired resonance’. Historians have variously described 
the declinist narrative of the 1970’s as ‘constructed’, (Black and Pemberton 
2013) as ‘ideological’ (Tomlinson 2000 and 2013), and as ‘mythology’ (Hay 
2010). A political discourse of declinism continues to describe the 
contemporary history of Britain through ongoing accounts of the economic 
crisis of 2008 and its aftermath (Black and Pemberton, 2013, Hay 2010) and, I 
argue, is central to the Mail Online’s speculative fear appeal. 
As others have noted (Charteris-Black 2005, Flood 2002, Kelsey 2015), to 
describe political events as myths is not to judge the events and their occurrence 
either as lies, as untruths, or to claim that they did not happen, rather it is to 
make an evaluation of the ways in which such events are subsequently 
discursively accounted for. The ‘story’ which inevitably accompanies an event, 
or period of political significance, that describes and explains it to an audience 
with little, no, or only partial direct experience of it, possesses the quality of 
myth when it is ‘an ideologically marked account of past, present or predicted 
political events and which is accepted as valid by a social group’ (Charteris-
Black 2005: 23). Declinist accounts of the political crisis of the 1970’s would 
also seem to satisfy a second criteria of Christopher Flood’s (2002) influential 
account of political myth, that in acceptance of it as valid by a social group, 
‘whatever its size or constituency’, that it is ‘transmitted and received’ as 
‘exemplar history’ (2002: 41). Black and Pemberton (2013) similarly take this 
up when they describe ‘negative memories and representations of the [1970’s]’ 
as having been ‘hardwired… into the national and popular consciousness’ 
during the intervening decades. Speaking specifically of the Winter of 
Discontent, Hay (2010) also comments, ‘it is difficult to think of a moment in 
the political history of post-war Britain more suffused with imagery and 
mythology’ (ibid: 456).  
Subsequent analysis of Britain’s economic performance in the 1970’s, and of its 
relative standing in the world, the recurring tropes of the declinist myth 
(Tomlinson 2001 and 2013), have tended to challenge popular accounts of the 
1970’s ‘as a decade of profound, even existential, crisis in Britain’. Whilst forced 
to accept nevertheless that there existed ‘the widespread perception of crisis at 
the time’ (Black and Pemberton 2013: 3). Black and Pemberton account for this 
by arguing that a constellation of what van Dijk refers to as symbolic elites 
(2008: 14), comprising significant elements of the media, journalists, 
academics and intellectuals, and politicians, contributed to the construction of 
a public perception of the period as ‘The Great Fear’ (Johnson 1985: 19). The 
Great Fear comprised ‘fear of the unions, of inflation, of bankruptcy and of 
unemployment; fear of being ‘swamped by the blacks’, of the ‘takeover by the 
left’, and of the ‘fascist threat’; fear of parcel bombs, of street violence… and 
finally, a generalised fear of social or national disintegration’ (ibid: 129).  
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Tomlinson (2000) similarly argues that ‘in the 1970’s the panic about economic 
performance was commonly used to suggest that the whole society was on the 
verge of collapse’ (ibid: 89). Apocalyptic tropes link sacred myths to modern 
contemporary myth formations (Flood 2002; Lule 2001) and provide a 
dramatic language of eschatology to accompany relatively historically 
frequently occurring and mundane political occurrences and events. These are 
especially prevalent in the declinist myth discourse where several features of 
the economic landscape of the 1970’s have since passed into hegemonic 
memory, yet are still important for contemporary constructions of declinist 
political myths, including the Mail Online article. According to Hay (2010), 
principle amongst these are the National State of Emergency declared in 1973, 
the ‘Three-day Week’ during the same period accompanied by nightly 
‘blackouts’, the General Election of 1974 against the backdrop of a national 
miners strike, the almost constant ‘stagflation’ of rising prices and rising 
unemployment coupled with stagnant economic demand (ibid: 448-9), 
persistent instability of the currency and the effects of this on Britain’s 
international standing culminating in the ‘humiliation’ of requiring a ‘special 
loan’ from the IMF during 1975-6, and ultimately the Winter of Discontent of 
1978-79.  
The events of that winter and their conversion into a contemporary Sun 
newspaper headline (ibid: 451), which was the first reference to the ‘Winter of 
Discontent’, follows a simple discursive logic. Whilst acknowledging ‘wonderful 
raw materials for a crisis narrative’, according to Hay (ibid: 466), ‘both tabloid 
and broadsheet media alike… brought this down to a very personal level, 
enlisting the direct experiences of bins left un-emptied, gaps on supermarket 
shelves, queues in supermarkets for basic commodities and so forth, in support 
of its crisis narrative.’ Declinism is a powerfully persuasive political myth by 
virtue of this, precisely because it is able to lend description to apparently, or 
potentially, degenerating political environments via experiences such as these 
that are perceived by receivers as personally important and potentially harmful, 
and above all, proximate.  
As previously noted, the construction of manipulative fear appeals depends on 
the (re)production of rhetoric that will induce emotional reactions since it is the 
cognitive appraisal of a condition of threat, danger or crisis rather than the ‘raw 
materials’ themselves, that are key (De Castella et al 2009). Just as Barthes 
argues that mythology is a construct of history, and ‘cannot possibly evolve from 
the nature of things’ (Barthes 1993: 110), so ‘Prime Minster Corbyn and the 
1000 Days that Destroyed Britain’ invokes hegemonic memory via the 
descriptive power of the declinist myth of the 1970’s to induce a negative 
emotional response by (re)producing the rhetoric and imagery of ‘The Great 
Fear’ of that time. As we shall see, and in so doing, the Mail Online constructs 
a speculative fear appeal that describes the descent of Britain into a nightmarish 
dystopian future which ‘only ‘serve(s) to revalidate the present as the lesser evil, 
and to promote a decision for no change’’ (Moylan 2000: 181).  
3.1 Utopia/Anti-Utopia in Political Myth 
Black and Pemberton (2013), referring to ‘hegemonic memories’ arising from 
‘popular representations’ of the 1970’s, argues that the prevalence of dystopian 
imagery and the rhetoric of crisis and panic has contributed significantly to 
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popular memories of that time. Van Dijk (2008, Wodak et al 2016) has 
discussed the crucial role of memory in sifting and storing the mental models 
of such events. Mental models, he argues (2008: 161), are subjective 
categorisations ‘that form the cognitive basis of all individual discourse and 
interaction’. Mental models are symbiotically produced, and understood from 
our cognitive experience of events or actions and function to give us our 
personal meanings of these things, both as discrete objects, and through 
forming longer chains of experiential meaning in extended social discourses. 
He argues that there are potentially many varieties of information which 
contributes to the structure of our mental models of experience. These may be 
newly acquired, whether through direct experiences, or those mediated by 
texts; the traces of past experiences through earlier forming mental models to 
the more personal types of information contribution via individual selves, and 
finally through socially and culturally shared information. Mental models, 
accordingly, ‘embody both personal and social information, and hence serve as 
the core of the interface between the social and the individual’ (ibid: 161).    
Mental models formed of the political events of the 1970’s by interpretive 
communities, who, as Kelsey (2015:29) points out includes both its producers 
(including symbolic elites); as well as its receivers (including symbolic elites), 
invoke the dramas of the declinist myth through rhetoric and imagery of 
economic chaos and social crisis leading to political disintegration and collapse. 
Bottici’s contention that it is the role of myth to bring drama onto the political 
stage is instructive in this regard (ibid: 26). Both Black and Pemberton (2013), 
and Hay (2010), have commented on how the Conservative party specifically, 
and the New Right generally, was able to exploit this dramatic content for 
electorally beneficial ends after 1979 by referring to the ‘crisis’ period as 
‘Labour’s Britain’. Charteris-Black (2005: 90) has demonstrated also that in her 
carefully chosen use of metaphor, how Margaret Thatcher was able to construct 
herself as a latter day Boedicia taking on and slaying her many political foes, 
chief amongst these being socialism itself.  
The socialist enemy, according to the developing myth of 1970’s declinism, had 
created a political crisis so serious, ‘as to call into question the viability of the 
British state’ (Black and Pemberton 2013). Dystopian imagery, basic to the 
declinist myth and central to the journalistic fiction of the Mail Online article, 
belongs to the genre of Utopia, and describes a society ‘in time and space that 
the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as considerably worse 
than the society in which that reader lived’ (Moylan 2000: 155).  Dystopia as 
the negative future realisation of a contemporary political trend is a frequently 
used genre in popular fiction. Anti-utopia describes utopia’s antithesis, since ‘it 
draws its material from utopia and reassembles it in a manner that denies the 
affirmation of utopia’ (Kumar 1987: 101). Anti–utopia’s, and anti-utopianism it 
has long been recognised (Eccleshall 1984, Moylan 2007, Sargent 2010, 
Sargisson 2007), is a significant feature of political conservatism in ideological 
opposition to what it has historically characterised as the utopian ‘fantasy’ 
(Sargent 2010: 121) or ‘starry eyed’ progressivism of ‘socialist or liberal 
programmes of social transformation (Eccleshall 1984: 67).  
As Eccleshall (ibid: 64) has noted of what he calls the traditional attitude to 
social transformation within conservative ideology, it is the belief that the 
political desire ‘for liberty and equality would result in forms of despotism and 
52 | P a g e   C A D A A D  
 
 
oligarchy more oppressive than any of the inconveniences and imperfections of 
the ancient regime.’ Conservativism and anti-utopia connect to dichotomous 
fear appeals in two fundamental ways analogous to this. Firstly, a dystopian 
outcome is the nightmarish logic of the ‘antithetical yet interdependent’ (Kumar 
1987: 100) utopia/anti-utopia binary. Dystopias ‘make us fear the world they 
describe in order to encourage us to re-describe our own world and make us 
aware of the trajectory our current descriptions place us on’ (McLear 2010: 26). 
Secondly, anti-utopia’s make use of fear ‘to preserve the status quo and to argue 
against systemic political change’ (ibid 26).  
In this way they share rhetorical similarities with dichotomous fear appeals 
since both can be ‘used as strategies to bypass deliberation and scare audiences 
into adopting a rhetor’s preferred alternative’ (Pfau 2007: 233). The anti-utopia 
predicted by ‘Prime Minster Corbyn and the 1000 Days that Destroyed 
Britain’, as the inevitable outcome of a progressive political agenda centred on 
the eradication of social and economic inequalities in the UK, and the pursuit 
of international peace abroad, is entirely in keeping with these positions. The 
rhetoric and imagery of the myth of decline, and here its overlapping twin, the 
mythic anti-utopia, provides both a dramatic description of the descent into 
social, economic and political chaos and, organised via a dichotomous fear 
appeal dressed up in the Mail Online article as speculative fiction, ‘celebrates 
and protects the status quo and the satisfactions that it delivers to its 
beneficiaries’ (Moylan 2000: p131).  
4. Analytical Framework 
Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) stress the argumentative, adversarial and 
action oriented-ness of political discourse which is directed towards affecting 
the decision-making processes of political actors. Adopting this approach, I see 
dichotomous fear appeals as also rooted in the politics of political action. The 
use of myth in political discourse, what Flood (2002) and Kelsey (2012, 2015) 
term political myth, is similarly found in a definition of politics that sees 
decision making as a central activity, since it (myth), ‘carries the imprint of the 
assumptions, values, and goals associated with a specific ideology or 
identifiable family of ideologies, that it therefore conveys an explicit or implicit 
invitation to assent to a particular ideological standpoint’ (Flood: 42).  
Darren Kelsey (2015) provides a very useful model of this process, what he calls 
DMA, or discourse mythological approach. DMA constructs its approach to the 
analysis of myth by separating myth from ideology and seeing them instead, as 
Flood does, as separate but related categories. Myths, he argues (ibid: 28), 
should be considered as the drama laden narratives or stories by which ideology 
is carried or conveyed and disseminated via interpretive communities. Kelsey 
presents his model graphically as a circuit, in which ‘discourse constructs the 
story (myth) that carries the ideology, whilst ideology also informs the 
construction of discourse’ (ibid: 29). The implied intertextual and re-contextual 
processes inherent in his model are indicators of the (ever) presence of history 
to this approach, in which ‘analysis is concerned with myth, popular memory 
and national narration’ (Kelsey 2012: 27).  
DMA argues that ideology is carried by myths in a historical process in which 
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‘interpretive communities consider the different ways in which texts are read, 
consumed and understood’ according to their conceptual maps (Kelsey, 2015: 
30), or, to use van Dijk’s terminology, ‘their mental models’ (van Dijk 2008; 
Wodak 2016). My approach applies Kelsey’s methodology in the following ways. 
Firstly, by arguing that the construction of popular memory in the Mail Online’s 
article is intertextually pursued through the construction and reproduction of 
‘familiar messages, signs and symbols’ of the declinist myth, particularly of, and 
since, the 1970’s. Secondly, by identifying through the use of the binary 
utopia/anti-utopia myth the Mail Online article as strategic political discourse, 
a dichotomous fear appeal, ‘oriented towards decision-making that can ground 
action’(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 22).  
It is the contention here that the overlapping myths, declinist and utopia/anti-
utopia, function differently in the Mail Online article but complement one 
another. The declinist myth operates descriptively by re-contextualising the 
rhetoric and imagery of periods of past political crisis and panic, and construing 
them in the present as hegemonic memories through shared mental models. 
The rhetorical construction of the utopia/anti-utopia myth operates 
instructively by warning its community of readers of the inevitable and 
catastrophic future outcome of pursuing a particular course of political action 
in the present. Since this is a dichotomous fear appeal, and not its open, 
deliberative and ‘civic’ alternative, it is discursively constructed ‘to argue for a 
single political or ideological viewpoint rather than to open a discussion of 
political alternatives’ (McLear 2010: 30).  
For example, Pfau (2007) points to the significance of the recursive character 
of fear in the dichotomous fear appeal, since, he argues, ‘rhetorical 
intensification’ of fears already established ‘is almost always a sure sign of the 
very kinds of logical distortion and audience manipulation traditionally 
associated with fear appeals in political discourse’ (ibid: 231). By contrast, in 
the ‘civic’ fear appeal variant he argues that the character of fear differs (ibid: 
233), representing unrecognised or underappreciated threats to community 
wellbeing with the political effect of this being to open up ‘deliberative 
possibilities’ in ways described by Fairclough and Fairclough as commensurate 
with reasonable political action (2012: 26). The dichotomous fear appeal 
analysed here, uses recurrent past and future context categories of the declinist 
and utopia/anti-utopia myths to close down alternative potentialities in the 
present, and to advocate instead ‘pragmatic’ political action in the sense meant 
of this by van Dijk (2016: 67), ultimately a rejection of political change, and 
acquiescence instead to the present status quo. 
For van Dijk (2016), it is context categories that give discursive structures their 
essential political dynamic, and that as he further points out, ‘some of these 
structures may be more efficient than others in the process of influencing the 
minds of recipients in the speaker’s or writer’s own interests’ (2016: 226). 
Myths, within the context category of the fear appeal, provide the perfect 
discursive structures for the Mail’s manipulative political text, since they can 
‘serve as the necessary interface between socially shared political cognitions on 
the one hand, and personal beliefs on the other (van Dijk 2012: 159)’. Kelsey 
(2015: 29) describes this with respect to the discourse mythological approach 
in terms of the properties of myths operating at the micro and macro levels of 
social cognition as ‘societal stories reflecting ideals, ideologies and beliefs, 
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whilst more broadly upholding familiar narratives or models for social life.’ 
Here there are similarities between van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach to 
political discourse analysis, Kelsey’s discourse analytical approach to political 
myths, and the social psychological approach taken with respect to the 
construction of fear appeals by De Castella, et al (2009). As noted earlier, for 
them it is the interpretation of actions or events, rather than the direct 
experience of the events themselves that is the crucial determinant for the 
evocation of a kind of emotional reaction (ibid: 4). To demonstrate this they 
turn to appraisal theory and adapt Richard Lazarus’s (De Castella et al 2007; 
Lazarus 1999) cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion to show how 
fear inducing rhetoric in political discourse can invoke emotional reactions, 
along with ‘the articulation of a political program and calls to support a course 
of action’ (De Castella et al: 3).  
This model proceeds from the identification of three key appraisal components 
that I want to posit as discursive fields of analysis for the Mail article (see table 
below), and that in turn define what Lazarus terms as the core relational theme, 
which I have argued previously is best described as anxiety. The three key 
appraisal components are, respectively, motivational incongruence, 
motivational relevance and uncertain coping (De Castella et al 2009; Lazerus 
1994: 237) and are set out in the table below.  
Key Appraisal 
Components for the 
production of anxiety 
(fear) derived from 
Lazerus’ (1994) 
Appraisal Characteristics of 
De Castella et al’s Model of 
Fear Appeal Construction 
(2009).  
Discursive Fields of the Mail 
Online’s Speculative Fear 
Appeal: Prime Minister 
Corbyn and the 1000 Days 
that Destroyed Britain.  
Motivational 
Incongruence 
Whether the situation or 
event as described is 
perceived as dangerous and 
the estimation of the degree 
of potential threat. 
 
Danger, threat and dread in 
the 1970’s myth of declinism 
and the ‘Great Fear’.  
 
Motivational Relevance The degree of personal 
relevance, or importance 
attached to a political 
situation or event as 
described. 
Social division, cultural 
impoverishment and violent 
disorder: The political 
consequences of social 
dreaming.  
Uncertain Coping Ability to cope with and 
manage the situation 
effectively toward the 
eventual resumption of 
environment stability 
Political Pessimism and 
National Decline - Crisis 
Preceding the Restoration of 
Authority.  
5. Discussion and Findings 
In Prime Minister Corbyn and the 1000 Days that Destroyed Britain 
evocations of the disastrous consequences of electing a left wing government as 
an alternative to the contemporary politics and economics of austerity provided 
the central mechanism for an elite instruction to reject radical change for the 
preservation of the political status quo. The three appraisal themes outlined in 
the preceding table (section 4.0) are all present in the article, which I discuss 
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below, and operate persuasively for the promotion of an anxiety response. 
Statements that establish motivational incongruence do so through deployment 
of rhetorical strategies that are designed to provide a contextual, or explanatory 
framework based on the myth of declinism and the ‘great fear’. These are 
concerned in particular with evoking crisis imagery from the political past, 
specifically the 1970’s, and superimposing this onto a speculative future.  
Statements of motivational relevance emphasise a close proximity between the 
appraisal of events depicted and degree of personal threat assumed, connecting 
the drama of precipitous and violent political decline to personal insecurity and 
disempowerment. An important component of this is that motivational 
relevancy is emphasised in the text as established through connections made 
between the exercise of political will through personal values, judgements and 
actions, and the consequences and responsibilities that potentially flow from 
these. Motivational incongruence is evoked through the binary opposition 
utopia/anti-utopia by which the descent into a speculative dystopian future is a 
consequence of personal and collective ‘social dreaming’ (Sargisson 2007).   A 
secondary appraisal theme, Uncertain coping, arises from and requires the 
presence of these others. Uncertain coping is established in the text through 
rhetorical appeals that make plain a low expectation of the ability of the country 
to be able to cope with profound and existential political shocks, the result of 
chaos brought about loss of authority.       
5.1 Declinism and ‘the Great Fear’ - Evoking Danger, Threat and 
Dread: Motivational Incongruence.  
Danger, threat and dread are prefaced in the first sentences of the article with 
London described having descended at the end of Corbyn’s doomed 
premiership into nightmarish violence, with its ‘myriad burning buildings, 
rioters, looters and demonstrators fighting on the city streets.’ The narrative 
thus establishes global coherence via a reverse chronology structure. As 
Richardson points out (2007: 71), journalism, and especially tabloid 
journalism, typically organises narratives by what he refers to as the ‘inverted 
pyramid, or climax first structure.’ Structuring narrative in this way places the 
most important information at the head of the story, typically including its 
central dramas, main protagonists, themes and topics (ibid: 71). This is 
important here for two reasons. First, because within the opening three 
paragraphs the author is able to identify the article’s central protagonist, 
Jeremy Corbyn, describe his chaotic and violent demise and reasons for it, 
evoke the dramatic setting and contextual background of this drama, and then 
explain that these events occur in a fictionalised, though realistic and proximate 
timeline. Secondly, and since this article is a fear appeal, the function of the 
‘climax first’ structure in placing the most dramatic and viscerally the most 
traumatic events first establishes immediately those criteria relating to the 
appraisal of danger, threat and dread that are core related fields of motivational 
incongruence.  
Danger, threat and dread is further evoked by use of familiar genres from the 
declinist discourse, particularly that of economic crisis leading to the erosion of 
Britain’s status and prestige on the national and international political stage. 
These rely on the deployment of two image rich and striking metaphors of 
decline. The widely known crisis health metaphor ‘sick man of Europe’ from the 
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1970’s and 1980’s (Hay 2010 Charteris-Black 2005), which is here transposed 
to a ‘basket case Britain’ of irreconcilable social and economic conflict. 
Additionally the flexible, visceral and contemporary crisis metaphor of ‘perfect 
storm’, which in the text is used to explain the convergence and culmination of 
several specific economic consequences of existential threat. The political use 
of metaphor as a persuasive rhetorical device is noted by Richardson (2007), 
O’Shaughnessy (2004) and by Charteris-Black (2005: 13), who accounts for the 
impact of health metaphors in particular, since, as he says, they are derived 
‘from a basic paired set of fundamental human experiences: life and death’ 
(Charteris-Black 2005: 100).  
The use of ‘basket-case Britain’ in the opening paragraph references three 
examples of the collective memory of the 1970’s crisis. Britain’s spiralling 
national debt, the consequent requirement for the sitting Labour Government 
of that time to seek emergency loans from the IMF and European Central Bank, 
and the long industrial wage disputes with mainly public sector workers and 
their unions (Hay 2010: 410). The connection between the speculative decline 
prefigured in the Mail Online article and its origins in the 1970’s crisis is made 
further explicit in this section in a warning about a future Corbyn led 
government’s attempts to redistribute wealth through raising of the top rate of 
income tax.  This, it states, amounts to a ‘throwback to the 1970’s – the last time 
Labour tried to defy economic reality.’ This warning is framed by concerns for 
the ramifications of such an ideological assault on the structures and assets of 
the capitalist class, and ultimately upon capitalism itself. By utilising metaphors 
of declinist myth, the article is able to warn that such an intervention is doomed 
to failure, evoking the authority of experience of the past to make a speculative 
connection to the reality of a future economic disaster. A high rate of income 
tax the article states, would raise only ‘rock bottom revenues’, bringing with it 
its inevitable economic consequences. Thus, declining tax revenues brought 
about through attempts to ‘defy economic reality’ by taxing the rich punitively, 
are shown to have devastating consequences for all, including the interpretive 
community of Daily Mail readers. 
Unemployment, the cost of welfare, and inflation the article says, would all ‘sky 
rocket’, whilst the economy inevitably would shrink as a consequence.  
Tomlinson (2000) has shown how the consequences for prices of the economic 
crisis of the 1970’s holds particular symbolic importance for the declinist myth 
of that period. The article invokes this through the ‘perfect storm of financial 
catastrophe’, by describing the reappearance of stagflation as prices continue to 
rise and demand in the economy declines. Further identifiers of the 1970’s 
declinist myth are also deployed such as ‘sharp increases’ in prices for basic 
commodities as bread, the inability of hospitals to pay for routine procedures 
and medicines, and the closure of factories and high street shops. The iconic 
declinist imagery of blackouts, referring to the ‘three day week’ periods of 1973-
4, are interposed with the similarly iconic memories of an earlier period of 
British austerity, food rationing. In this metaphorical ‘perfect storm’, appraisal 
components come together connecting threat of crisis to personal losses and 
concerns. The abstract structures of the macro economy and their symbolisers, 
inflation and taxation, prelude examples of the experiential micro economy of 
Mail Online readers forming a discursive linkage that connects the decline of 
the micro economy experienced by the Mail’s interpretive community, with 
ideological assaults meant to ‘soak the rich’ through redistributing wealth in the 
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macro economy.   
5.2 Social Division, Cultural Impoverishment and Violent Disorder: 
The Political Consequences of social Dreaming (Motivational 
Relevance) 
Evaluation of the importance of events is closely connected in Lazerus’s (1994) 
core relational theme anxiety to patterns of cognitive appraisal that relate to the 
estimation of the degree of personal danger and proximity that is attached to 
them. Statements of motivational relevance in the text relate to the imminence 
of threat and danger presented by the violent collapse of society into a dystopian 
near future. What are constructed as existential national threats are directly 
attributable to a betrayal of ‘our’ values, and the substitution of these by ‘their’ 
values, and are a consequence of the seductive but ultimately insidious and 
destructive logic of the utopia/anti-utopia myth binary. 
This is framed throughout the text by the nominative construction of Corbyn’s 
Labour government through the attachment of negative ideological labels.  
Words and statements such as ‘Commie’, ‘Communist’, ‘hard-left’, ‘far left’, and 
references to ‘Militant Tendency’, ‘socialism in one country’, ‘The Red Flag’ and 
a ‘siege economy’, are used frequently and repetitively. Indexical choices such 
as these when used to define individual and collective social actors are, 
according to Reisigl (2008: 99), significant of the construction of populist 
rhetoric. Negative left-wing labels used in close semantic relation to the Labour 
Party are doubly suggestive in this context being also evocative of the rhetoric 
of the declinist myth ‘in an association between socialism, immorality and evil’ 
(Charteris-Black 2005:97). The suggestive implication of a relationship 
between socialism and decadence are present in the description of Corbyn’s 
physical and mental health at the conclusion of his premiership. The 
descriptions of him as ‘frail’, under ‘strain’, ‘broken’, and ‘trembling’; but also 
‘baffled, bewildered and bemused’ by the evidence of the failure of his political 
vision, is narratively constructed as analogous to that of the country which he 
has almost destroyed, a ‘basket-case Britain.’  
This, according to the text, is the result of a series of disastrous political choices 
and judgements to which the Mail Online apportions degrees of responsibility 
and blame through what van Dijk has called ‘discursive group polarisation’ 
(2008: 226). Binary oppositions are framed in the text as being both the causes 
and the consequences of disastrous political decision-making that the Mail 
attributes to personal and political mendaciousness, and/or naivety. The article 
identifies at least three binary group polarisations that are generational, young 
vrs old; ideological, ‘conservative’ vrs ‘socialist’; and cultural, traditional vrs 
radical. These are framed in terms of the opposition of values, and discursively 
through the utopia/anti-utopia myth.  
Young people are identified as responsible in the first instance for enabling the 
‘ruination’ of Britain by electing a Corbyn led Labour government. The article 
states that ‘an astonishing 83 per cent of 18-25 year olds turned out to give him 
their vote…. galvanised by a brilliant social media campaign’. The reasons for 
their voting in such numbers are described in crudely instrumental terms. The 
young are seduced with promises of ‘free university education, no student debt 
and guaranteed jobs.’ They are cynically manipulated by Corbyn whose persona 
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resembles that of the mythic trickster, an archetypal figure at once seductively 
playful and wilfully destructive (Lule 2001: 24). This dualism is considered by 
the Mail to have a dramatic allure for the young in particular, highlighted by 
the almost gleeful rejection of what are identified in the text as belonging to core 
national values. For example, Corbyn supporters are described as 
enthusiastically responding to his refusal to observe the conventions of political 
obsequiousness to the monarchy, or deference to the ‘special relationship’ with 
the United States, and as being ‘thrilled’ at his refusal to accept the rules of 
orthodox political alignments in his defiant support for ‘Islamic terrorist 
organisations’.  
In contrast the older generation is ‘shocked’ at the country’s inexorable slide 
towards an authoritarian dystopia via the appeal of utopian ‘false promises’ for 
the young, and the simultaneous rejection of what is discursively constructed 
as realism, being the preservation of the status quo. Realist and utopian 
positions are especially emphasised in relation to foreign policy with respect to 
national security where the consequences of ‘social dreaming’ in relation to 
defence disarmament are implied to have directly threatening personal 
consequences. The article states that having destroyed the ‘special relationship’ 
with the United States by his identification of the US as ‘our most wicked 
enemy’,  Corbyn then makes a ‘grovelling apology’ for the Iraq War of 2003, 
before drastically cutting defence spending and ultimately abandoning the 
country’s independent nuclear deterrent. As a direct consequence, ‘US 
President Donald Trump announced that America could no longer regard 
Britain as a reliable ally.’ This leads to calls for Britain’s expulsion from NATO 
and the imposition of economic sanctions. Whilst the article describes a 
ratcheting up of threats to personal security through unilateral disarmament, 
so it simultaneously warns of reigniting the dangers of an historical and 
contemporary national antagonist. A powerful and covetous Germany, who 
‘made it plain that Britain could not escape the medicine taken by other EU 
nations that had found themselves in crisis.’ Written prior to Britain’s 
momentous decision to exit from the European Union in 2016, the longstanding 
anti-EU Mail Online warns ominously that ‘London would have to take its 
orders from Berlin just as Athens had done,’ in 2015. 
5.3 The spectre of terminal decline and apocalypse averted: 
Uncertain coping and the restoration of authority  
Fear appeals invoke anxiety in the final instance when an event or situation is 
appraised as being extremely difficult and potentially impossible to cope with. 
Statements which confer the secondary appraisal theme uncertain coping are 
present when a sense of profound pessimism is linked to the existential threats 
and concerns conveyed by the primary appraisal components  (Lazarus 1991: 
236; De Castella et al 2009: 5). Prime Minister Corbyn and the 1000 Days that 
Destroyed Britain is a fictional anti-utopian story, a political myth that exists 
in binary relation to the utopian story for which it is its antithetical twin. Like 
many of the most well known anti-utopias, the Mail article imagines political 
dystopia as a consequence of ‘social dreaming’ (Sargisson 2007: 26) which 
becomes manifest by a descent into state authoritarianism through national 
decline. As the social and economic situation of the Mail’s speculative fiction 
deteriorates still further, so the negative logic of progressive political change 
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becomes increasingly apparent.  
The institution of Prime Minister, conferred on Corbyn by the naivety and poor 
political judgement of the young, is imagined as threatening to pass from 
democratic accountability to dictatorial rule, the inexorable and seemingly 
irreversible slide into despotism. Corbyn’s own party is unable to control him, 
and is subsequently purged. Normally functioning checks and balances of the 
democratic political process are described breaking down as members of 
government associated ‘with the hated Blairite past’ are denounced by Corbyn’s 
new regime via public confessionals, reminiscent of the Stalinist show trials of 
the Soviet Union. Here the nominative labelling of the Labour Party as 
‘Communist’ and ‘hard left’ makes association with the state communism of the 
Soviet era conceptually plausible, even self-evident.  
Slide towards authoritarianism and political dystopia is further signalled by 
curtailment of press freedoms through legal censorship, and by Corbyn’s 
‘desperate pleas for the people to rally against the forces of capitalism.’ 
Consistent with dominant frames of the declinist myth the article goes into 
considerable detail in its description of an argument over economic policy 
involving Corbyn, whom it describes as becoming increasingly vengeful and 
authoritarian in his policy responses as the situation in the country rapidly 
deteriorates, and Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England. Carney is 
indexically refered to as coolly authoritative in contrast to Corbyn, and delivers 
wry self-assured observations about the essentialism of economic markets, even 
as he prepares to leave the country having been punitively sacked by Corbyn.  
Accompanying familiar imagery of 1970’s declinism the article uses 
contemporary examples as descriptive indicators of the slide into crisis. These 
are discursively aligned to give a sense of proximity and immediacy, whilst as 
well conveying a sense of finality and loss. The article describes the pop band 
‘One Direction’ as heading out of the country on tour never to return, and 
similarly the football stars of the Premier League as departing for lucrative 
financial rewards abroad. ‘A multi-billion pound league became a two-bob 
back-water with second rate players, poverty stricken clubs and half empty 
stadiums,’ the article states, connecting economic ruin to the ruin of Britain’s 
popular culture. Elsewhere, having established authorial sympathy for a long 
running strike by the police, the article describes the final breakdown of law and 
order, declaring [that] ‘the disorder that had played out on the streets of Athens 
a decade earlier were now replayed on a vastly bigger scale. As riots became 
commonplace, families lived under self-imposed curfew.’ The use of Athens as 
a recent example of the near collapse of a European state resulting from severe 
economic and social crisis is additionally referenced by the use of a photograph 
depicting riot police engulfed in flames from a petrol bomb during disorder 
there in 2015.  
It is at this point in the narrative, as the drama of myth appears to have reached 
its denouement in apocalyptic violence and dystopian chaos, that the article’s 
core manipulative logic is revealed. Disaster is avoided at the last moment and 
authority reinstated. The restoration of social order is achieved precariously 
nonetheless, which is consistent with the appraisal of uncertain coping. The 
Mail attributes Corbyn’s ultimate downfall to a degree of national good fortune 
as an increasingly enfeebled prime minister, literally the ‘sick man’ of Britain’s 
decline, is described as ultimately ‘lacking the stomach’ to become Dictator, and 
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chooses instead voluntary political exile. Simultaneously, constitutional 
authority is restored only via the belated exercise of parliamentary democracy 
necessitated by the political courage of a rejuvenated Conservative Party. Here 
the leader of the opposition, imagined in the article as the prominent right wing 
MP Boris Johnson, emerges to lead a vote of no confidence in Corbyn, forcing 
his decision to flee the country. Only at this late hour, according to the Mail 
Online, is national destruction averted and the authority of political realism 
restored.  
6. Conclusion 
The Mail Online article ‘Prime Minister Corbyn and the 1000 Days Which 
Destroyed Britain’ presents a speculative Labour government with a Corbyn 
premiership as an existential threat to Britain, that brings with it near total 
national destruction. It is a strategic political discourse in the sense meant of 
this by Fairclough (2012: 24), in that it directs readers towards actionable 
rejection of the politics of wealth redistribution, social equality and peace 
through disarmament, and ultimately persuades them towards acceptance of 
the historical status quo, offering only this as an alternative to the dystopia of 
progressive politics. Consistent with the strategic discursive logic of the 
dichotomous fear appeal, it does so via a narrative strategy of the triumph and 
restoration of traditional forms of authority and order, out of political chaos 
and disorder. Such tropes are familiar in both journalism and popular literature 
and as Lule (2001: 36) points out, fundamental to mythic storytelling. By 
approaching fear appeal construction through a critical discourse analysis of its 
use of myth, it is intended that this paper makes a contribution to the expanding 
knowledge of the role and significance of myth in the production of political and 
journalistic discourse.  
References 
Baccolini, R. and M. Moylan (eds.) (2003). Dark Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian 
Imagination. London: Routledge.  
Bennett, A. (2016). ‘EU referendum: a timeline of Remains’ ‘Project Fear’ campaign.’ The 
Telegraph, June 20th.  
Black, L and H. Pemberton (2013). The benighted decade? Reassessing the 1970s. In L. Black, 
H. Pemberton and P. Thane (eds.), Reassessing 1970’s Britain. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. pp 3-25. 
Bottici, C. and B. Challand (2006). Rethinking political myth: The clash of civilisations as a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. European Journal of Social Theory 9 (3): 315-336.  
Charteris-Black, J. (2014). Analysing Political Speeches: Rhetoric, Discourse and Metaphor. 
London: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
Charteris-Black, J. (2005). Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor. 
London Palgrave-Macmillan. 
Conboy, M. (2005). Tabloid Britain. London: Routledge. 
Conway, M., Grabe, M. E. and K. Grieves (2007). Villains, victims and the virtuous in Bill 
O’Reilly’s ‘No-Spin Zone’. Journalism Studies 8 (2): 197-223. 
P a n a y   P a g e  | 61 
 
 
De Castella, K., McGarty, C. and L. Musgrove (2009). Fear appeals in political rhetoric about 
terrorism: An analysis of speeches by Australian Prime Minister Howard. Political 
Psychology 30 (1): 1-26. 
Eccleshall, R. (1984). Conservatism. In R. Eccleshall et al (eds.), Political Ideologies: An 
Introduction. London: Routledge. pp. 60-91.  
Fairclough, I. and N. Fairclough (2012). Political Discourse Analysis. London: Routledge. 
Fairclough, N. (2003). Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. London: 
Routledge. 
Flood, C. (2002). Political Myth. London: Routledge.  
Gordon, T. (2014). ‘I admit it: The man who coined project fear label.’ Herald Scotland, 21st 
December.  
Green, C. (2014). ‘Scottish independence: BBC Scotland’s referendum coverage 
“institutionally biased”, Alex Salmond claims.’ The Independent Online, 14th September.  
Gunter, J. (2015). ‘Tory theme of Corbyn’s “threat to national security” draws criticism.’ The 
Guardian.com, September 13. 
Harris, S.A. (2015). ‘Alex Salmond insists BBC bias affected outcome of Scottish 
Independence Referendum.’ The Huffington Post UK, 18th September.  
Hay, C. (2010). Chronicles of a death foretold: The winter of discontent and construction of 
the crisis of British Keynesianism. Parliamentary Affairs 63 (3): 446-470. 
Kelsey, D. (2012). Remembering to forget: Supporting and opposing the war on terror 
through the myth of the Blitz Spirit after the July 7th Bombings. Critical Approaches to 
Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines 6 (1): 23-37. 
Kelsey, D. (2015). Media, Myth and Terrorism. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.  
Kelsey, D. (2016). Hero mythology and right-wing populism. Journalism Studies 17 (8): 1-17.  
Kelsey, D. (2013). Myths, Monarchs and Prime Ministers: ‘Blitz Spirit’ discourses of royalty 
and Tony Blair in British newspaper responses to the July 7th bombings. JOMEC Journal 1 
(3): 1-17. 
Kumar, K. (1987). Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times. London: Blackwell. 
Lazarus, R. (1994). Emotion and Adaptation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Lule, J. (2001). Daily News, Eternal Stories: The Mythological Role of Journalism. New 
York: The Guildford Press.  
McAlear, R. (2010). The value of fear: Toward a rhetorical model of dystopia. 
Interdisciplinary Humanities 27 (2): 24-42.  
Middleton, R. (2013). Brittan on Britain: Decline, declinism and the ‘traumas of the 1970s’. In 
L. Black et al (eds.), Reassessing 1970’s Britain. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
pp 123-147. 
Moylan, T. (2000). Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia. New 
York: Westview Press.  
Pfau, M. W. (2007). Who’s afraid of fear appeals? Philosophy and Rhetoric 40 (2): 216-237. 
Richardson, J. E. (2007). Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse 
Analysis. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Sargent, L. T. (2010). Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Sargisson, L. (2007). The curious relationship between politics and utopia. In T. Moylan and 
R. Baccolini (eds.), Utopia Method Vision: The Use Value of Social Dreaming. London: 
Verlag Peter Lang. pp. 26-45. 
Taylor, F. (2003). Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World 
to the Present Day. Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
62 | P a g e   C A D A A D  
 
 
Thomas, D. (2015). ‘Prime Minister Corbyn and the 1000 days that destroyed Britain.’ The 
Mail Online, 23rd August.   
Tomlinson, J. (2000). The Politics of Decline: Understanding Post War Britain. London: 
Longman. 
Tomlinson, J. (2013). The politics of declinism. In L. Black et al (eds.), Reassessing 1970s 
Britain. Manchester: Manchester University Press. pp 47-61. 
Wodak, R. and M. Krzyzanowski (eds.) (2008). Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social 
Sciences. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Wodak, R. (ed.) (2016). Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage.  
Wright, O. (2016). ‘Michael Gove accused of “desperate” and “hypocritical” scaremongering 
over migration in EU debate.’ Independent Online, 20th May.  
Van Dijk, T. (2008). Discourse and Power. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
